Is it obstruction of justice and obstruction of a Supreme Court order if an Officer of the Court assumes a prosecutorial role in an indirect contempt action to financially benefit his client because such conduct was prohibited by the Supreme Court in Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton?
Is it obstruction of justice and obstruction of a Supreme Court order, if a federal judge orders an American citizen arrested, held, and taken by force across state lines without a warrant that states an Act of Congress by statute or a notice of criminal contempt meeting the requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 42?
Is it obstruction of justice and obstruction of a Supreme Court order, if a federal judge issues an injunction without following Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65?
Is it obstruction of justice and obstruction of a Supreme Court order, if a federal judge orders financial sanctions without identifying the sanctionable conduct as required by Rule 11c(3) or complying with the formats of Rule 52a and Rule 54a?
Is it obstruction of justice and obstruction of a Supreme Court order, if a federal magistrate judge and lawyers in a federal civil court proceeding engage in or solicit ex parte conferences about the merits or the procedures leading to a decision on the merits?
Is it obstruction of justice and obstruction of court order, if lawyers represent insurance companies in a matter pursuant to an errors and omissions insurance contract, if the insurance companies have not registered with the state insurance regulators in the forum state?
Does the evidence contained within demonstrate obstruction of justice and obstruction of court order by the civil defense counsel?
Does the supervisory authority of the Supreme Court in this case mandate relief from judgment for the plaintiff and a striking of the defense pleadings resulting in the defendants being placed into default?
District Court order dismissing the District of Colorado case 02-cv-1950 Sieverding v. CBA et al. (Appendix A)
10th Circuit Affirmation of Order dismissing the District of Colorado case 02-cv-1950 Sieverding v. CBA et al (Appendix B)
District of Colorado order shifting attorney bills (Appendix C)
10th Circuit affirmation of the attorney fee shifting (Appendix D)
District of Kansas memorandum order dismissing that action (Appendix E)
10th Circuit affirmation of the Kansas dismissal (Appendix F).
District of Columbia Memorandum Order Dismissing the Complaints Sua Sponte (Appendix G).
The D.C. dismissal of the Sieverding Appeal (Appendix H).
Affirmation with modifications of injunction against litigation by 10th Circuit (Appendix I)
District of Columbia sua sponte injunction against pro se litigation. (Appendix J)
10th Circuit Denial of Recall from Mandate (Appendix K)
Court of Appeals for DC Circuit denial of second motion for crime victim status (Appendix L)
Supreme Court jurisdiction is invoked under mandamus for obstruction of justice by the defense counsel and because the defense counsel disobeyed the Supreme Courts’ order in Young v. United States Ex Rel Vuitton, 107 S. Ct. 2124, 481 U.S. that a lawyer must not act as prosecutor in an indirect contempt action to benefit their client. In Young v. United States Ex Rel Vuitton, the Supreme Court took jurisdiction using their supervisory powers.
This action involves a litigant without legal training in a civil matter who was denied the written procedures. “This Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts to prescribe binding rules of evidence and procedure.” Dickerson v. United States, NO. 99-5525 (U.S. 06/26/2000)
The history involves injunctions that were issued without Rule 65 procedure and form. The Colorado Supreme Court used its supervisory authority in Stull v. District Court of Pueblo County, 308 P.2d 1006, 135 Colo. 86 (Colo. 03/18/1957) when an injunction was issued without compliance with Rule 65.
This action involves a U.S. citizen who was taken into detention and transported by the U.S. Marshals in chains across state lines without a request by the Justice Department or a warrant stating an Act of Congress by number or name. There were pre-scheduled contempt of court hearings that were not proceeded a notice of criminal contempt meeting the requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 42. There was a hearing resulting in jail in which she was told that she did not have a right to a defense lawyer or an evidentiary hearing.
The Supreme Court exercised supervisory authority in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) saying (“Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence”).
The U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction as a supervisory court under 28 U.S.C. Part V Chapter 111 §1651. Writs because Sieverdings’ Equal Protection rights were invaded and there was obstruction of justice below.
The Sieverdings first Supreme Court petition was found defective on 10/24/07 and they were offered 60 days extension.
On 12/14/07, Colorado Judge Nottingham held a CanonIIIb (3) hearing and Brougham testified then he had ex parte conference about 02-1950 with Magistrate Schlatter in Jan. 2003. The Sieverdings do not have a potential forum in the 10th Circuit because, previous to the most recent disclosure about the telephone call with the magistrate, it ordered that its clerks should not accept any more documents from petitioner. [Appendix K.] They also ordered the clerks not to accept pleadings from the Sieverdings on the injunction against self representation (06-3178) as a minute order on 12/2/06. Thus, the Sieverdings do not have a mechanism to convey this information or any other information to the 10th Circuit. All of the damage cases have been dismissed without oral briefing at the applellate level. The appeal of 05-02122, 06-3178, was denied rehearing on 11/27/06. The original Colorado case was denied rehearing on 6/2/05.
The Sieverdings filed motions in both the D.C. Court of Appeals and the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals to be declared crime victims so they could receive benefits under the Justice For All Act, but those petitions were denied. (U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, 07-5126/07-7060/07-7068 per curiam order 1045949 6/8/07 “Nor do appellants’ allegations show the commission of a Federal offense, or that any crime occurred in the District of Columbia, or that appellants qualify for relief as a “crime victims.” § 3771(d)(3), (e) and per curiam order 1059503 8/9/07) The appeals were dismissed without briefing on 8/8/06.
Mrs. Sieverding filed in the10th Circuit (06-1439, 3/26/07 2012468 e-motion) asking for a master to determine why there is no certificate of interested parties showing the insurance companies as specifically required by 10th Circuit Rule46.1, but the panel “denied all outstanding motions”.
A. The basis for mandamus is obstruction of justice:
Must the Supreme Court intervene when there is obstruction of justice by the defense counsel in order to avoid a jury trial? Must it use its equitable powers to punish obstruction of justice with default?
B. Evidence the Sieverdings acted in good faith:
“Describing each of the individual defendants and all of their claims that are asserted against each one of them would be interminable...the claims against the Bennetts read like the table of contents for a hornbook on torts”. (District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Schlatter 10/14/2003 pp6-7)
The award of attorney bills does not identify any fraudulent statements by the Sieverdings, nor any threats they made, or any discovery abuses. There was no discovery. The Sieverdings were not accused of disrupting a hearing. The Sieverdings filed a “motion by plaintiff for (discovery) of any and all evidence of improper contact between the plaintiff, the defendants, and their attorneys”, but no replies were filed. (District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 document 192 10/16/2003)
A lawyer in Steamboat Springs, William Hibbard, who had represented the Sieverdings in 2000-2001 and was familiar with the events there, had read their 02-cv-1950 complaint and sent Mrs. Sieverding a letter saying: “I did have a chance to read through the voluminous pleadings while I was up at the cabin. Interesting theories especially against the ABA and the Colorado Bar Association”. (District of Columbia 05-01283, Document 30 p. 27)
On 12/14/07, Mr. Sieverding attended an oral hearing with Judge Nottingham, who has ordered the sanctions. Judge Nottingham said:
“I think you don’t always understand what is going on. And I mean –I don’t mean that in a pejorative way. You’re just untrained in the law” (District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 Court 12/14/07 transcript p. 4 Judge Nottingham to David Sieverding)
C. Evidence of involvement of insurance companies that sold errors and omissions insurance in Colorado but did not register with the Colorado Department of Insurance:
David Brougham billed Underwriters at Lloyd’s London c/o Lord, Bissell & Brook Attn Walter Slezak for claim 6603013-1896”. (10th Circuit 06-1439 AP-0505).
The bills from McConnell Siderious et al to TIG Insurance were submitted in 02-cv-1950 document 464. Bills from Faegre & Benson LLP to O’Brien, Butler, McConihie and Schaefer LLP for Mutual Insurance were submitted in document 461. Mutual Insurance was referenced on 10/29/04.
Mrs. Sieverding searched the web site of the Colorado Department of Regulatory Affairs for these insurance companies and posted copies of the web pages in “motion for judicial notice that the Colorado Department of Regulatory Records for Lloyds of London, Beazley, Mutual Insurance based in Hamilton, Bermuda, or TIG Insurance. (District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 document 1001)
10th Circuit local rule 46.1 says ““The certificate (of interested parties) must list all... insurers” but the defense counsel filed no certificate acknowledging Lloyds, TIG, or Mutual Insurance. (10th Circuit 06-1439, 3/26/07 2012468)
D. Evidence of ex parte oral and written communications with the magistrate:
Before the defendants were even served, the assigned magistrate, O.E. Shlatter, already had a conversation the defense lawyer David Brougham recently described as:
“Are you going to represent City of Steamboat Springs? And I said yes. He said, well, what I think I’m going to do is set a status conference” (District of Colorado, 02-cv-1950 transcript 12/14/07 p.8)
“Telephone call from Dave Brougham advising me that the clerk for Magistrate Schlatter advised that no Reply would be necessary” (District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 document 465)
Brougham’s historical billing detail refers to “Telephone call to court regarding response to motion to compel” 6/11/03, “Telephone call from clerk regarding certain motions, 7/2/03, “Confer with court clerk regarding status of ruling on motions”, 8/14/03, “Confer with court regarding status of pending motions and timing of ruling”, 8/15/03, “Confer with court regarding status of motions” 9/09/03, “Further conference with court staff regarding motion status”, 12/11/03, “Confer with court regarding status of plaintiff pleadings, pending motions, etc. Analyze motion to enjoin grounds, etc.” 1/07/04 (District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 document 465)
Magistrate Schlatter’s report includes:
“I received letters from two different lawyers complaining that Mrs. Sieverding persisted in her efforts to contact them.” (District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 document 188 p. 53)
E. Evidence of solicitation of ex parte conference with the District of Colorado judge:
“On 10/20/03, the pro se plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the A.B.A....The A.B.A. respectfully requests that Plaintiffs’ motion as against the A.B.A. be stayed, as well as the time in which the A.B.A. is required to respond to plaintiff’s motion, until such time as this Court rules on the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation... If your honor prefers that this request be presented by formal motion, or has any questions or needs further information concerning this request, I respectfully ask that your Honor’s clerk call me at 312-988-6684.” Patricia Larson, A.B.A. in-house counsel, District of Colorado letter 10/28/03 Document 242
F. An injunction was issued without Rule 65 procedure and the Sieverdings were not allowed to contest the legal validity of the injunction thru the contempt of court process as described in Tory et al. v. Cochran, 125 S.Ct. 2108, 544 U.S. 734, 161 L.Ed.2d 1042 (U.S. 05/31/2005):
There are three continuing injunction orders in the appendix that were issued without bond or identification of illegal act to be avoided. They include references to the District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 complaint. These are attached:
Appendix District Court order dismissing the District of Colorado case 02-cv-1950 Sieverding v. CBA et al. (Appendix A)
District of Columbia District Court sua sponte injunction against pro se litigation. (Appendix J)
Affirmation with modifications of injunction against litigation by 10th Circuit Court of Appeals (Appendix I)
Before she was jailed Mrs. Sieverding attempted to contest the validity of the injunction as instructed by the Supreme Court in Tory et al. v. Cochran, which she had read and relied on:
“[A] person subject to a court’s injunction may elect whether to challenge the constitutional validity of the injunction when it is issued, or to reserve that claim until a violation of the injunction is charged as a contempt of court”. Tory et al. v. Cochran, 125 S.Ct. 2108, 544 U.S. 734, 161 L.Ed.2d 1042 (U.S. 05/31/2005)
However, Judge Nottingham would not allow her to rely on the Supreme Court decision as she attempted when she said:
Kay Sieverding, petitioner: “In construing an order, words must be given their ordinary and customary meaning. The order said ‘based on’. It did not say ‘based on including’. It did not say ‘based on related’....Ambiguities in the scope of a restraining order will be resolved in the favor of the defendant.... A person subject to a court’s injunction may elect whether to challenge the constitutional validity of the injunction when it is issued or to reserve that claim until a violation of the injunction is charged as a contempt of court. That’s Supreme Court...” (oral motion 9/2/05, pp.22-26)
Judge Nottingham “your time is up...Now, what you say is exactly what I told you I wasn’t going to hear” District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 oral hearing 9/2/05 transcript p26.
G. Evidence of assumption of prosecutorial role by a financially motivated lawyer:
Judge Nottingham: “This matter is before the Court on the motion for an order citing the plaintiffs for contempt ...Now, Mr. Beall, I understand that you’re taking the lead on this one, so to speak?”
Mr. Beall: “Yes, Your Honor, I am”
Judge Nottingham: “All right. You may proceed.”
(Transcript District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 Document 884 p.3)
“this is civil not criminal contempt. They do not have a right to counsel. They do not have the right to a jury trial. They do not have the right to a full and complete evidentiary hearing.” Christopher Beall pp 13-14
H. Sample of evidence of threats by the defense counsel:
“While she was still incarcerated at the Clear Creek County Jail pursuant to the Court’s order, Kay Sieverding filed an entirely new pro se lawsuit, this time in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, again based on the same series of transactions described in this case... require David Sieverding to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for assisting Kay Sieverding.” Christopher Beall motion filed in District of Colorado 12/12/05 document 704 p.5.
“In light of Mrs. Sieverding’s renewed efforts to litigate pro se civil actions that this Court already has found to violate its filing restrictions, Mrs. Sieverding should be ordered to appear before this Court and show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court and committed to the custody of the U.S. Marshal’s Service until such time as she fully complies with this Court’s order to terminate all litigation that violates the Court’s filing restrictions”. (02-cv-1950 document 862 Beall motion 8/10/06 P.4.)
“She filed motions for reconsideration in the District of Columbia cases 0501283, 0501672 and 0052122... ask the Court [to issue] a bench warrant in this matter”. (District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 9/22/06 transcript Document 884 p.5.)
City of Steamboat Springs publishes on their web site as city council minutes:
“The Federal District Court held a contempt hearing regarding Kay Sieverding. She refused to dismiss the cases that she filed and was arrested. Mr. Sieverding dismissed the cases but later reneged and said that he would not dismiss the cases, so he may be arrested as well.” (District of Colorado 02-cv-1950, document 997)
J. Evidence of jailing ordered by Federal Judge Nottingham without a warrant that states an Act of Congress by Statute or Common Name or notice of criminal contempt meeting the requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 42:
The District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 docket shows that contempt of court proceedings were scheduled on 9/2/05, 1/4/06, 2/16/06, and on 9/22/06. None of these included or were proceeded by an order of criminal contempt meeting the requirements of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure. Mrs. Sieverding was ordered jailed by Judge Nottingham from 9/2/05 to 1/4/06. She was detained in Wisconsin on 2/6/06 at his order but was released on her agreement to attend a contempt of court hearing on 2/16/06. An order for her arrest was issued 9/22/06 but she was not in court to be detained. She was detained on that warrant on 5/10/07 in Wisconsin, taken by the Marshals to Colorado, and released by Judge Nottingham on 6/1/07.
There are two warrants shown in the court files for District of Colorado 02-cv-1950. One was issued on 2/2/06 and one on 9/22/06. The charge listed on both is “failure to appear in a civil matter”. There is no Act of Congress listed by statute or common name on either warrant.
K. Description of financial award to the defense counsel:
On 9/22/07, Judge Nottingham ordered the Sieverdings to pay the defense counsel $101.864.82. (Appendix C) The award does not specify any misconduct by the Sieverdings.
L. Garnishment and publication of non-final judgment:
In March 2004, Judge Nottingham recommended that the Sieverdings have to pay all the legal bills generated by six law firms for over a year for any and everything related to the Sieverdings. Magistrate Schlatter said that the Sieverdings could not dispute the amounts of the bills. (District of Colorado 05/17/2004 document 487 p.1)
The magistrate published an order claiming that the Sieverdings owed the defense counsel $111,862. The Sieverdings have not yet exhausted their appeal time on the attorney bills and that is part of this petition. The District of Colorado clerks’ office confirmed that they did not issue a Form 451, a requirement for proceeding with a collection action. Without waiting, the law firms filed a “registration of foreign judgment” in Dane County WI. In Wisconsin, a garnishment action is supposed to be a separate proceeding and there are special forms. These were not filled out. However, the defendants all the Sieverdings’ bank accounts down to $1.00.
After the garnishment, Judge Nottingham ordered the Sieverdings to pay the defense counsel, they did not remove the notice of foreign judgment as requested. (Dane County 2005 FJ26a). That affects their credit and access to business capital.
M. Continued Internet publications by defendant Steamboat Pilot.
The original complaint included media tort claims against the Steamboat Pilot. They continued to publish the disputed articles on the Internet and also published new articles about 02-cv-1950 litigation. Sieverding posted on the comments sections on those Internet articles that they republished fraudulent statements. Those statements accused Sieverding of a crime and of incompetence in her college major, city planning. The Pilot deleted her comments contesting the statements about her and disabled the comments posting sections on those articles. (District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 document 858 “Request that the defense associates cease publishing about plaintiff on the Internet”.
N. Refusal to docket
The District of Columbia has not docketed many of Sieverdings filings. They were refused an ECF account even though they have computer skills, Internet access, and had previously used ECF. Their paper filings were not entered into the docket on many occasions. (District of Colorado, 02-cv-1950 document 996 notice of service on DC court and defense counsel.) This resulted in a lack of ability to use motion practice and a dismissal of their Appellate Court for the District of Columbia Circuit being dismissed as untimely even though they provided copies of timely delivery receipts. (U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit 07-7060 PER CURIAM ORDER filed [1059247] of the motions to dismiss the appeals, the consolidated response and supplement thereto, and the consolidated reply, it is ORDERED that the motions to dismiss be granted and Nos. 07-5126, 07-7060, and 07-7068 be dismissed [1040984-1]
The 10th Circuit 06-1439 10/11/07 order also includes a sua sponte order to the clerks not to docket.
O. Development of case law undermining the Anti Injunction Act:
In District of Columbia, Judge Urbina issued a sua sponte injunction against litigation, which he attached to his memorandum order dismissing their case (Appendix J).
Mrs. Sieverding objected. The ABA filed:
“Federal courts are authorized under U.S.C. 28 Section 1651(a) to sua sponte enjoin a party from filing further papers ...the traditional standards for injunctive relief, i.e., irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at law, do not apply.” (District of Columbia 05-02122 document 38.)
The Sieverding precedent has already been cited by the 10th Circuit to justify injunctions against litigation. (Deelen v. City of Kansas City, Missouri, No. 06-1896 (8th Cir. 10/19/2007), Gaiters v. City of Catoosa, No. 06-5168 (10th Cir. 05/22/2007), Andrews v. Tacha, No. 07-CV-0200-CVE-FHM (N.D.Ok. 05/08/2007)
P. District of Colorado prejudice against litigants without law licenses shows in statistical results:
“Approximately 2,500 to 3,000 cases are filed here each year. That is the number of cases that are divided up among the district judges. Of that total number of cases that are filed, approximately 600 each year are cases that are filed by litigants without counsel....my magistrate judge colleagues and I cannot recall a single case in which a pro se litigant has proceeded all the way through a case, obtained a jury trial and received a favorable verdict... if such exceptions exist, we have not heard of them”. Magistrate Schlatter 03-N-2293 Steiner v. Concentra Inc. 8/5/2004 “Order denying plaintiff’s motion to recuse”. P.5.
The Sieverdings are helpless in this situation. If the Supreme Court does not intervene the defendants will probably a.) Garnish their bank accounts and take their possessions or continue to publish claiming that the Sieverdings owe them so that the Sieverdings and their business will not have access to credit. b.) Continue to publish articles on the Internet regarding the Sieverdings c.) Re-incarcerate Mrs. Sieverding or incarcerate her husband and/or children.
The 10th Circuit ruled in November 2006 that the District of Colorado had no authority to intervene outside the 10th Circuit (Appendix I ) and Mrs. Sieverding thought she was safe from seizure because she filed a habeas appeal in the 10th Circuit and did not litigate within the 10th Circuit. However, on 5/10/07 the Verona Wisconsin police showed up at her home and took her into custody based on the 9/22/05 warrant for failure to appear on a civil matter.
Mrs. Sieverding was taken before the magistrate in Western Wisconsin. There
the assistant U.S. attorney Robert Anderson said: “the government isn’t a party to this.” transcript 5/11/07 p. 2. Despite that Mrs. Sieverding was held for three weeks without charges.
Judge Nottingham: “They may choose to abandon any contempt proceedings in this court if you will agree not to file any further pleadings in this case...They have a right to pursue contempt proceedings if they wish to... If they wish to pursue contempt proceedings, Ms. Sieverding, you may not be out of the words, so to speak. However, you can negotiate with them.” District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 transcript 6/1/07
There may be a question of certiorari, but the Sieverdings do not know it. What they know is that they filed an interstate diversity complaint with Hornbook torts and supported economic damages of over the minimum $75,000. They verified their complaints under penalty of perjury but no fraud on their part was claimed. Instead of going to a jury for review of their claims, they were threatened, put in jail, and fined.
The threats from defense counsel seem to meet the exact legal definition of criminal extortion.
After 5 years of litigation with no discovery and no stipulations of fact, remand to prove facts would be difficult.
What the Sieverdings think will help them is 1.) Cessation of fraudulent publications about them 2.) Relief from defendants’ garnishment actions. 3.) Recognition of their damages thru cash award.
If the Supreme Court uses its authority to find the defendants in default because they a.) Engaged in ex parte b.) Solicited ex parte c.) Made threats d.) Carried out threats e.) Represented insurance companies that did not registered with state authorities, then a.) The Sieverdings will be helped b.) Similar use of ex parte and threats will be discouraged and c.) Insurance companies will be encouraged to register with state authorities.
The local rules prohibited phone calls to the magistrates without the Sieverdings presence nevertheless Brougham and Lettunich engaged in telephone calls with Magistrate Schlatter in January and February 2003.
Canon III b 2 requires that a judge require standards from his staff that do not involve communicating with litigants about procedural strategies affecting the merits. However, the attorney representing the ABA requested that Judge Nottingham send messages thru his clerks about her request to stay summary judgment hearings.
Christopher Beall made repeated threats to jail the Sieverdings if they did not withdraw related claims and succeeded in getting Mrs. Sieverding jailed three times. The Sieverdings believe that it was legal for the Sieverdings to petition the other courts and, therefore, they think that since they were threatened for doing what is legal, that they were extorted. When Mr. Beall acted as prosecutor at the 9/2/05, 1/4/06, 2/16/06, and 9/22/06 hearings, asking for Mrs. Sieverding to be put in jail unless and until she wrote what Beall wanted, that is exactly what the Supreme Court ordered him not to do in Young v. United States Ex Rel Vuitton, 107 S. Ct. 2124, 481 U.S.
The Supreme Court has authority to find attorneys in contempt of court when they violate court orders. When the lawyers act as prosecutors to get people put in jail so that their clients do not take any chance of losing a lawsuit, are not they are in contempt of the Supreme Court? They think that when a lawyer asks a judge to have his assistant call them about their proposal to skip a Rule 56 Summary Judgment hearing, that that is obstruction of justice. When a lawyer garnishes bank accounts without a final judgment signed by an authorized official, isn’t that also obstruction of justice? The use of courts by insurance companies not registered with state authorities must be bad public policy because state authorities were created and funded after extensive discussion about public needs to be protected from insurance companies.
Congress has neither suggested nor approved special procedural requirements for litigants without law licenses, who now account for about one quarter of all litigants. Case law is not to amend the Judiciary Act, that is to be saved for a formal procedure involving Congress and the Supreme Court. Use of case decisions to change the law for litigants without licenses is illegal.
The Court should extend the Colorado Supreme Court rulings in Stull v. District Court of Pueblo County, 308 P.2d 1006, 135 Colo. 86 (Colo. 03/18/1957) that an injunction is void if it is issued without rule 65 procedure and in Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672 (Colo. 01/20/1987) that the 14th amendment applies in litigation. The Court should say clearly that lower federal courts cannot jail U.S. citizens with the justification of an Act of Congress and following the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and remind lawyers of its statement in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937) “One has no constitutional right to a “remedy” against the lawful conduct of another.”
The Court should act to prevent use of federal courts by agents of insurance companies that are not registered with state insurance authorities to sell the contract under which they insured the claim. The Court should shield the Sieverdings with the Constitution and use its equity powers to find the defense counsel in contempt and the defendants in default.
A. Supreme Court must use its supervisory powers when there is obstruction of justice and lower courts do not remedy.
If the Court does not use its equity powers when there is obstruction of justice, the Badman’s Rule will prevail:
“I think it desirable at once to point out and dispel a confusion between morality and law, which sometimes rises to the height of conscious theory, and more often and indeed constantly is making trouble in detail without reaching the point of consciousness. You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore you can see the practical importance of the distinction between morality and law. A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practiced by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if he can.” The Path of the Law by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.10 Harvard Law Review 457 (1897)
B. Court recognized its obligation in similar cases involving 4th Amendment violations.
“Where...it is clear that the action of the State violates the terms of the fundamental charter, it is the obligation of this Court so to declare.” Shelly v. Kraemer 334 U.S. 1, (United States Supreme Court 1948)
The Supreme Court used its supervisory powers in Young v. United States Ex Rel Vuitton when an interested prosecutor was also appointed.
The Supreme Court became involved with foreign citizens were held in Guantanamo Bay. Similarly the Supreme Court should involve itself when their government without the required procedures to determine that they committed a crime, jails citizens in the U.S.
The Supreme Court recognizes its supervisory authority in actions by the federal government involving criminal prosecutions and any procedure that may result in incarceration should involve rigorous procedures. That obligation should not be avoidable by labeling the action “civil contempt”.
C. Use of injunctions against litigation, private prosecutors, sua sponte injunctions, and injunctions not meeting Rule 65 requirements facilitate injustice.
The Supreme Court of Colorado was firm:
“the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in not complying with Rule 65, R.C.P. There is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy available to petitioners except that herein sought. The petition filed in this court set forth the necessary facts and circumstances calling for the exercise of our discretion, and we consider it a matter of “great public importance” when an inferior court has issued injunctive orders without complying with the provisions of Rule 65. Mr. Justice Holland in Kellner v. District Court (1953), 127 Colo. 320, 256 P.2d 887, said that a case in which a court is proceeding without jurisdiction of the persons or subject matter also involves a matter of great public importance. Thus construing our rules and the cases we have referred to, we determine that the facts here involved present matters of sufficient public importance to call for the intervention of this court to prevent a manifest injustice. The Rule is made absolute.” Stull v. District Court of Pueblo County, 308 P.2d 1006, 135 Colo. 86 (Colo. 03/18/1957)
The U.S. Supreme Court should affirm the Colorado Supreme Court’s Stull decision.
D. Precedence of soliciting the court to deny its Canon III responsibilities risks others.
Justice is at risk because Patricia Larson was able to send Judge Nottingham a letter instead of filing a motion. The Sieverdings wanted to have their summary judgment motion heard to make progress in narrowing the issues, but Ms. Larson asked Judge Nottingham to skip that procedure. The result is that they lost access to their evidence. The fact that Larson was working for the ABA when she asked the Judge to skip the hearing increases the likelihood other litigants will write to judges asking them to skip Rule 56 hearings. Was that letter a crime?
“Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States magistrate judge or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection.” Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 73, § 1503.a Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally.
Is it legal to ask a judge to skip a hearing if you do not threaten him or is that Conspiracy to Deprive Rights under Color of Law? Did not the Sieverdings have a legally enforceable right to the summary judgment hearing because pro se litigants have an equal protection right to the written procedures?
“Cannot arbitrarily discriminate against the pro se litigant who, as much as the litigant represented by counsel, has the right to seek judicial relief for the redress of legal wrongs in accordance with procedures applicable to all who use the courts....The chief judge’s directive at issue here clearly discriminates against pro se litigants solely on the basis of their pro se status and, in that respect, lacks any rational basis in fact and thus violates equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by article II, § 25 of the Colorado Constitution.” Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672 (Colo. 01/20/1987)
E. Criminal extortion?
The definition of criminal extortion in Colorado is:
“(1) A person commits criminal extortion if: (a) The person, without legal authority and with the intent to induce another person against that other person’s will to perform an act or to refrain from performing a lawful act, makes a substantial threat to confine or restrain, cause economic hardship or bodily injury to, or damage the property or reputation of, the threatened person or another person; and (b) The person threatens to cause the results described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) by: (I) Performing or causing an unlawful act to be performed; or (II) Invoking action by a third party, including but not limited to, the state or any of its political subdivisions, whose interests are not substantially related to the interests pursued by the person making the threat. (1.5) A person commits criminal extortion if the person, with the intent to induce another person against that other person’s will to give the person money or another item of value, threatens to report to law enforcement officials the immigration status of the threatened person or another person...
(3) For the purposes of this section, “substantial threat” means a threat that is reasonably likely to induce a belief that the threat will be carried out and is one that threatens that significant confinement, restraint, injury, or damage will occur. Colorado Revised Statutes 18-3-207. Criminal extortion.
Why is it not criminal extortion as described in C.R.S.18-3-207 to send documents requesting Judge Nottingham to put them in jail if Sieverdings did not withdraw their civil actions?
F. Felony witness intimidation?
The definition of witness intimidation is:
“(2) Whoever uses physical force or the threat of physical force against any person, or attempts to do so, with intent to—
(A) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding;
(B) cause or induce any person to—
(i) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding;
(ii) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use in an official proceeding”
U.S. Code Title 18 Part 1 Chapter 73 § 1512. Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant.
When Christopher Beall, Traci Van Pelt, David Brougham, and the other defense attorneys threatened Mr. and Mrs. Sieverding to stop them from going to or filing in court, was that witness intimidation as defined in section 2?
G. Is an Injunction against a legal activity a Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law?
“Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States” U.S. Code Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 13 Section 242 Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law.
H. Is jailing without the required procedural safeguards a Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law?
Mrs. Sieverding was not allowed advance notice of intent to jail, a defense attorney, a right to subpoena, a warrant stating An Act of Congress by Statute or name, a formal notice of contempt, a verified statement of probable cause, an explanation of the charges by the arresting officer, a preliminary hearing, an arraignment, a formal request by the governor of Colorado or chief justice and a statement of the offense by the Department of Justice before extradition from Wisconsin, nor a formal statement of reasons for release.
“ The court must give the person notice in open court, in an order to show cause, or in an arrest order. The notice must: (A) state the time and place of the trial... (C) state the essential facts constituting the charged criminal contempt and describe it as such.”Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Criminal Contempt Rule 42 Criminal Contempt (1) Notice.
The notice Judge Nottingham gave the Sieverdings did not charge the Sieverdings with criminal contempt.
“(a) In General.— Upon the appearance before a judicial officer of a person charged with an offense, the judicial officer shall issue an order that, pending trial, the person be— (1) released on personal recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond.” U.S.C. Title 18 Part II, Chapter 207 § 3142a Release or detention of defendant pending trial.
Mrs. Sieverding was not offered a bond but was sent straight to jail.
On 9/2/05, the day Judge Nottingham sent Mrs. Sieverding to jail the first time, he said:
“You’re going to be allowed to make a presentation, but it’s not the presentation that you probably have in mind, because I’m not going to listen to any more of the things that are in your papers...You have five more minutes to make any additional presentation you wish to make...your time is up”. (District of Colorado, 02-cv-1950 9/2/05 transcript document 884, pp 20-26).
The petitioners think that this abbreviated procedure in a hearing that resulted in four months of jail was a Deprivation of Sieverding’s Rights Under Color of Law.
The existing procedures used by the Federal Courts and the U.S. Marshals were inadequate to protect Mrs. Sieverding. She told the magistrate in Wisconsin:
“on the warrant, the place for the statute is blank. There’s no law. It says right in Title 18 in the part there about jails, that a U.S. citizen cannot be held by the U.S. government except pursuant to an Act of Congress, which means it is supposed to have a statute number...I looked it up that in the rules of criminal procedure that under number 4 it says that a warrant in order to be valid has to state what crime you are accused of and the probable cause and that warrant does not do so.” District of Western Wisconsin Transcript 5/11/07 p.12
The Wisconsin magistrate responded: “There is the concern that this court does not have any direction as to the authority under which we would continue to detain Ms. Sieverding. However, I will tell you that Judge Nottingham has informed this court that he does want Mrs. Sieverding detained and transferred to the District of Colorado” p. 2.
...“it’s not my place to judge what’s a valid warrant” 5/11/07 Transcript District of Western Wisconsin p. 7.
The Supreme Court should use its supervisory authority to make sure that U.S. citizens are not again detained by their government without a valid warrant as required by:
“Title 18, Part III, Chapter 301, § 4001 (a) No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”
I. Is a refusal to docket a Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law?
When a court refuses to docket, as the District Court of D.C. did, or a Court orders their clerks not to docket, as the 10th Circuit and District of Colorado did, is that Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law? When the Officers of the Court know about the problem and do not intervene, is that obstructing justice by denial of access to evidence?
J. Witness Retaliation by seizure of assets:
As Mrs. Sieverding, who is pro se, understands Rule 11, if a litigant does not misrepresent the facts or misquote the law, then they should not be fined. Accusations of fraud must be made with particularity, Rule 9b. If the judge does not identify what was written or said that was incorrect, and then orders you to pay the other side $101.864.82 (more than twice the 2006 median family income as reported by the U.S. Census bureau), she thinks that if the parties who are claiming one’s assets do not complain about receiving it under false pretenses and just remove the funds from your bank account, as the defendants did already, not waiting for Judge Nottingham to issue a final order so that it could be appealed, then is that is fraud by false pretenses? When they registered a foreign judgment for the attorney bills without waiting for the appeal process to be completed, that must be witness retaliation by seizure of assets.
The Sieverdings believe they did not do anything wrong when they filed in court because they told the truth about the facts, quoted the cases and laws correctly, did not threaten anyone, and tried their best to follow all the rules. So therefore, they think that when the defense counsel garnished their bank accounts, that what they did was witness retaliation as described in the highlighted sections:
“(b) Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any person for—(1) the attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding, or any testimony given or any record, document, or other object produced by a witness in an official proceeding;.” United States Code Title 18 Part 1, b Chapter 73, § 1513. Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant.
K. Magistrate Schlatter’s reports and all pleadings and reports endorsing it should be struck because of the ex parte contamination:
At a recent hearing, defense counsel David Brougham confirmed that he had an oral conversation with Magistrate Schlatter about the litigation. Anthony Lettunich sent many of the defendants a bill for a conference call with himself and Magistrate Schlatter labeled re Sieverding litigation. Lettunich did not appear at the 12/14/07 hearing to contest his bill for the ex parte conference.
“No attorney or party shall contact orally a judicial officer regarding any case by telephone, in person, or through any other means, unless all other parties in the matter, or their attorneys, are present or on the telephone.” D.C.COLO.LCivR77.2 Ex Parte Conferences
Therefore Brougham and Lettunich have confessed to ex parte with Magistrate Schlatter; Lettunich by his bill and Brougham by his 12/14/07 statement.
Brougham’s bills include over 20 entries for calling the court.
In a similar case in which a lower level adjudicator engaged in ex parte conference, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit used its supervisory authority and ruled that all reports incorporating the reports from the ex parte conference must be struck:
“In re: Brooks 383 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2004), in which we held Special Master Balaran’s ex parte contacts with parties and counsel to certain contempt proceedings arising from this same class action necessitated his recusal with respect to those proceedings under both §§ 455(a) and (b)(1) of 28 U.S.C. Id. at 1046. In order to protect those proceedings from the taint of his participation, we ordered that Balaran’s work product relevant to those proceedings be suppressed. Id. In light of that decision, Interior now urges us to suppress the three reports Balaran issued after he hired Smith...
We have held that a special master is subject to the same ethical restrictions as a judge when the special master serves as the “functional equivalent” of a judge even though the special master is under a judge’s “control.” Jenkins v. Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627, 630-32 (D.C. Cir. 1988)...
Interior responds that “a party confronted with adverse reports from a biased judicial officer is not required to litigate the merits of each of their findings and conclusions, but may properly obtain vacatur of the reports if grounds for disqualification are established.”...
We believe suppression of Balaran’s reports is warranted and indeed necessary. As we noted In re Brooks, “selection bias” does not necessarily manifest itself in the record; it may derive from “information that leave[s] no trace in the record.” 383 F.3d at 1046 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in the original). Balaran’s reliance upon Smith in choosing which documents to consider and, by implication, which documents not to consider, would lead “one fully apprised of the surrounding circumstances,” Cobell, 33... F.3d at 1143, to conclude Balaran’s interim report was likely affected by selection bias; Smith obviously was not a disinterested source, and his input was received ex parte and therefore untested by the adversary process. Because Balaran was disqualified from proceeding once he hired Smith, his subsequent work product -- including the April 2003 interim report of investigation and the two site-visit reports that followed -- must be suppressed. If those reports have not been used against the Department and are not presently part of the record before the district court, then so much the better; only s suppression can ensure neither the plaintiffs nor the district court will rely upon the reports in the future, to the detriment of the “public’s confidence in the judicial process.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864(1988).
Upon his hiring Smith, Balaran’s “impartiality might reasonably [have been] questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Therefore, we grant Interior’s petition for a writ of mandamus and order the suppression of the three disputed reports Balaran submitted to the court after he hired Smith. They shall “be stricken from the district court’s records” and given “no legal effect.” Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 1984) (striking from record reprimand of counsel and related comments made by judge disqualified for bias)”. In Re: Dirk Kempthorne Secretary of the Interior in his Official Capacity, Petitioner No. 03-5288449 F.3d 1265,2006.CDC.0000115
All the same laws apply to this case.
Mrs. Sieverding specifically asked Judge Nottingham why he dismissed their claims and the only reason he advanced was a preceding related filing. (District of Colorado 02-cv-1950 1/4/06 transcript p.15.) But previous to 02-cv-1950, the Sieverdings never served the defendants and there were no responsive pleadings so there was no claims preclusion because:
“it is no longer true that a judgment “on the merits” is necessarily a judgment entitled to claim-preclusive effect; and there are a number of reasons for believing that the phrase “adjudication upon the merits” does not bear that meaning in Rule 41(b).... that the effect of the “adjudication upon the merits” default provision of Rule 41(b)–and, presumably, of the explicit order in the present case that used the language of that default provision–is simply that, unlike a dismissal “without prejudice,” the dismissal in the present case barred refiling of the same claim in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. That is undoubtedly a necessary condition, but it is not a sufficient one, for claim-preclusive effect in other courts”. Semtek Int’l Inc v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (99-1551) 531 U.S. 497 (2001) 128 Md. App. 39, 736 A. 2d 1104 Supreme Court.
Sieverding quoted Semtek repeatedly. Either Judge Nottingham did not know that the preceding complaints in other courts were abandoned without service or he was prejudiced. Possibly he was unaware of the case and did not see it in the Sieverdings’ 10-page objection to Magistrate Schlatter’s 59-page report.
The Supreme Court has already ruled a judge’s ex parte conferences cannot be made harmless error:
“Nor, in any event, may the State’s trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled [409 U.S. 57, 62] to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance.” Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Supreme Court 409 U.S. 57 (1972)
In the District of Columbia cases simply relied on Magistrate Schlatter’s Report which they submitted to Judge Urbina as if it were valid.
L. Obstruction of court orders
“Whoever, by threats or force, willfully prevents, obstructs, impedes, or interferes with, or willfully attempts to prevent, obstruct, impede, or interfere with, the due exercise of rights or the performance of duties under any order, judgment, or decree of a court of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. No injunctive or other civil relief against the conduct made criminal by this section shall be denied on the ground that such conduct is a crime.” Title 18 Part 1 Chapter 73 § 1509. Obstruction of court orders.
What is a “order, judgment, or decree of a court of the United States”?
Are not the rules of civil procedure orders so that when the defense counsel takes plaintiffs assets under false pretenses, even though they have no Rule 11 claim to it because the Sieverdings did not lie to the court or the defense attorneys, is not that “obstruction of a court order”. When Christopher Beall assumed the role of a criminal prosecutor, except not even making sure that there was the required due process, with the motivation of saving money for his client, did not that violate the Supreme Court’s order from Young v. United States Ex Rel Vuitton, 107 S. Ct. 2124, 481 U.S. saying:
“we now reverse, exercising our supervisory power, and hold that counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed to undertake contempt prosecution for alleged violations of that order”?
The Court used its supervisory power in Vuitton when there was a financially motivated prosecutor. Because Beall did exactly what prohibited by the Supreme Court in Vuitton, he should be found in contempt.
The Sieverdings have no other options for relief that they know of, and they are really in a bad situation since they are already exhausted and now the defense counsel wants to take their financial assets including their livelihood as self-employed people. Their written rights were violated in an organized way by the defense attorneys. The Supreme Court should order relief from the unscrupulous lawyers.
Officers of the Court take an oath:
“as an attorney and as a counselor of this Court, I will conduct myself uprightly and according to law, and that I will support the Constitution of the United States.” (United States Supreme Court Admission to the Bar).
To be admitted in federal court, an attorney must also be admitted in the local state and agree to support the constitution of the state. Part of that should mean that they agree that they will not subject people to insurance companies operating contrary to state regulatory requirements. Should not lawyers be found in contempt of court when they contract to represent insurance companies that are doing business in a state as defined by the state but not registered and reporting to state regulators?
The court should use its equity powers when the illegal action of representing an insurance company that has evaded state regulation occurs in its courts.
One reason why the Sieverdings chose self-representation was to save money. That is common. Courts are an integral part of government. If only the wealthy have rights to jury trials, motion hearings, and other procedure developed to ensure a decision on the merits, then this country becomes not a democracy but a plutocracy.
M. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has the legal authority to declare the lawsuits over and find the defendants in default because of their obstruction of justice. The Supreme Court should say clearly that it is not legal to put people in jail because they pursued a civil lawsuit in an honest way and that if someone who is not trained in law is involved with a lawsuit they have enforceable rights even if they are not a lawyer and do not know all the procedures. Everyone should just follow the rules and procedures exactly as they are written. If lawyers cheat their opponents of their due process rights like these lawyers did, they and their clients should be found in default.
The Supreme Court should defend its courts from insurance companies acting to avoid the regulations that state legislatures determined are needed by imposing default if unregistered insurance companies are paying to defend a customer’s claim.
For the reasons above the Sieverdings ask the Supreme Court to order the lower judicial officers to order the defendants to stop threatening the Sieverdings and to pay them all the money from the lawsuits as if the defendants had never filed any papers, i.e. default. The defendants are responsible for their lawyers, who are supposed to consult with them before hurting anyone in their name:
“In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that might injure or coerce others.” Comment to Rule 1.4 Communication Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct.
Because of the five years of obstruction of justice, the defendants and their lawyers and insurance companies, should pay the Sieverdings. In order to stop these sorts of schemes from being used again, the Supreme Court should find the defendants in default in all four lawsuits. Hopefully that is enough of a penalty to make an impression and deter repetition of obstruction of court orders in order to get advantage in a civil matter.
Citation of Christopher Beall for Contempt of the Supreme Court.
Order District of Colorado prohibiting collection of the $101,864.82 attorney bill award.
Order District of Colorado to find the defendants in default in 02-cv-1950 on a joint and several basis in the sum certain amount of $15 million plus 12% interest from 3/1/04.
Order District of Kansas to find the defendants in default in 05-cv-2510 on a joint and several basis in the sum certain amount of $3 million.
Order District of Columbia to find the defendants in default in 05-cv-01672 on a joint and several basis in the sum certain amount of $15 million plus 12% interest from 3/1/04.
Order District of Columbia to find the defendants in default in 05-cv-02122 on a joint and several basis in the sum certain amount of $5.72 million.
Prohibition of injunctions against self-representation issued or affirmed by the District of Colorado, 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, and District of Columbia.